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FORMAL, SUBSTANTIVE, AND DISAGGREGATED
NEUTRALITY TOWARD RELIGION*
Douglas Laycock**
INTRODUCTION
A wide range of courts and commentators commonly say that government
must be neutral toward religion.' There are dissenters in both directions-
those who think that government can support religion, and those who pursue
separation to the point of hostility. In this Article, I will largely ignore those
dissenters. I will assume that neutrality is an important part of the meaning
of the religion clauses.
This Article is about the meaning of neutrality. My goal is to clarify the
concept, or at least to clarify our disagreements over its meaning. In the
course of doing that, I will address a third group of dissenters-those who
think that neutrality is meaningless and should be dropped from our dis-
course.
2
* This Article is adapted from the Sixth Annual Lecture of the Center for Church/State
Studies, which Professor Laycock delivered in Chicago, Illinois on April 6, 1989. Much of the
argument speaks as of that date. In the interim, the Supreme Court has announced sweeping
changes in the relevant law. Initial reaction to those changes is largely confined to inserts.
** Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, The University of Texas at Austin. I am
grateful to the DePaul University Law School and the Center for Church/State Studies for
their invitation, support, and helpful reactions to this lecture; to Jay Westbrook and Sanford
Levinson for helpful comments on an earlier written draft; and to the University Research
Institute at the University of Texas, for a research leave that made it possible for me to accept
DePaul's invitation.
I should disclose that I wrote and filed amicus briefs in the Supreme Court in the following
cases cited or discussed in this Article: George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness,
cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3598 (Feb. 28, 1990); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 58 U.S.L.W. 4720
(U.S. June 4, 1990); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688
(1990), and that I was of counsel on the petition for rehearing in Employment Div. v. Smith,
110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
1. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3098-3101 (1989). Earlier cases are collected in Laycock, Equal Access and
Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1, 2 n.6 (1986). Commentators are collected in Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MIcH. L. Rv. 266,
314 n.183 (1987).
2. For a clear statement of this position, see Smith, supra note 1, at 313-32. Cf. Valauri,
The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PiTr. L. Rv. 83 (1986).
Valuri would keep the concept of neutrality because its appeal is "compelling," but would
restrict the Supreme Court's power to enforce it because it is "multiply and irresolvably
ambiguous." Id. at 149, 151.
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Those who think neutrality is meaningless have a point. We can agree on
the principle of neutrality without having agreed on anything at all. From
benevolent neutrality3 to separate but equal, 4 people with a vast range of
views on church and state have all claimed to be neutral.
Consider Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.' The Supreme Court said that
Texas can not exempt the sale of religious publications from a sales tax that
applies to all other publications. Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia funda-
mentally disagreed on almost every issue in the case, but they both claimed
to be neutral. 6 Both of them used the word "neutrality," but neither of
them defined it.
Most of us think of ourselves as fairminded, and so we tend to assume
that our instinctive preferences are fair, and therefore neutral. Some scholars
have tried to define neutrality more carefully, but they have produced quite
inconsistent definitions.
Both of these points-the power of our instincts and the inconsistency of
formal definitions-were brought home to me when I presented a paper7 on
the Equal Access Act.' The Act tries to guarantee the right of student
religious groups to meet in empty classrooms on the same terms as other
extracurricular student groups. The Supreme Court has finally upheld the
statute, 9 ending six years of debate over its constitutionality. This seemed to
me an easy case to resolve with the neutrality principle. I argued that
government could not discriminate against religious speech by private speak-
ers.
A distinguished panel of commentators attacked me from all directions.
Ruti Teitel insisted that the only neutral course was to exclude the religious
speakers. She thought that my error was to treat as alike things that were
different.' 0 Geoffrey Stone argued that neutrality permitted my solution, but
certainly did not require it. He thought it was neutral to exclude the religion
club if the school board also promised to exclude the atheist club, if there
ever were one." Michael McConnell agreed with my solution, but he said
my definition of neutrality was "heterodox.' ' 2 He insisted that neutrality is
not a reliable principle, because properly defined, it is often at odds with
religious liberty.
3. See, e.g., R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH,
STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 1987).
4. Teitel, When Separate Is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, Unlike Chess, Do
Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1986).
5. 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
6. Id. at 898-99 (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 913 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Laycock, supra note 1.
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
9. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 58 U.S.L.W. 4720 (U.S. June 4, 1990).
10. Teitel, supra note 4, at 183-89.
11. Stone, The Equal Access Controversy: The Religion Clauses and the Meaning of
"Neutrality," 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 168, 170-71 (1986).
12. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146, 149 n.17
(1986).
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It was McConnell's attack that troubled me the most. I believe that
neutrality is consistent with religious liberty-indeed, essential to its preser-
vation. Our miscommunication did not seem to flow from any underlying
policy disagreement. As a result of that exchange, I feared that other
meanings of neutrality had so captured our vocabulary that I could not use
the term to communicate, even to sympathetic audiences and even when I
defined it. McConnell's comment on my definition of neutrality made it
inevitable that I would explore the definition in greater depth. I take con-
siderable comfort from McConnell's move toward a somewhat similar def-
inition in the intervening four years.1 3
I. Is NEUTRALITY WORTH DEFINING?
Maybe these conflicting uses of "neutrality" prove that we should abandon
the concept. A few years ago, Peter Westen stirred up a great fuss by
claiming that equality is an empty concept.' 4 Neutrality and equality are near
cousins; they have most of the same attractions and most of the same
inadequacies. If Westen were right, then neutrality would also be empty.
I am quite sure that Westen was wrong, but he highlighted something
important that we too often ignore. Equality and neutrality are not empty
concepts, but neither are they self-defining. They are insufficient concepts-
insufficient to decide cases without supplemental principles. Let me briefly
explain this point, with apologies to those who are familiar with the debate.
A claim to equal or neutral treatment is very different from an outright
claim of entitlement. If I go to court claiming a constitutional right to a
monthly check from the government, the court will laugh at me. It is up to
Congress, and not the courts, to create government benefit programs. But
if I go to court claiming a constitutional right to a check on the same terms
as someone similarly situated, I may have a serious claim. If Congress has
given social security benefits to women in my situation but not to men, I
13. See McConnell & Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1989) (proposing requirement of neutrality toward religion, conceived
not as "treating religion just like other activities," but as minimizing effects on religious
practice); McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Estab-
lishment Clause, 26 SAN Diaoo L. REv. 255, 260 (1989) (government "may not redistribute
wealth on the basis of an individual's, or group's, exercise of a constitutionally protected right,
unless it can show that it has a legitimate justification for doing so"). I have learned much
from what he has written. Of course, he is not responsible for anything I say in this Article.
14. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1982). For critical
commentary, see Burton, Comment on "Empty Ideas": Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality
and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136 (1982); D'Amato, Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea?,
81 MicH. L. REV. 600 (1983); Greenawalt, How Empty is the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1167 (1983); Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U.L. REv. 387 (1985). For
Westen's responses, see Westen, To Lure the Tarantula from Its Hole: A Response, 83 COLUM.
L. REv. 1186 (1983); Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math & Morals: A
Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1983); Westen, On "Confusing Ideas": Reply, 91 YALE L.J.
1153 (1982).
1990]
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
will probably win. 5 My claim to an equal entitlement to benefits is very
different from my claim to an outright entitlement to benefits.
Nor is it the case that once we have fully specified the entitlement, equality
drops out. Westen would say that once we decide that sex is not one of the
eligibility criteria, we no longer need equality to decide my case. That is
descriptively true, but it is not true until after we have decided. It begs the
question of how we decide that sex is not one of the eligibility criteria. The
elimination of sex as a criterion will depend in part on our understanding
of sexual equality, and not merely on the policy of the social security
program.
This separation in theory is greatly reinforced in practice by the consti-
tutional separation of powers. Congress first specifies the eligibility criteria,
and has sole responsibility for social security policy. But the Court reviews
those criteria to see if they violate its understanding of constitutional rights
to equality. This separation of responsibility for policy definition is critical
to the debate over Westen, and it has received too little attention. It means
that equality claims can never be collapsed into the initial specification of
the entitlement. So equality is not an empty concept.
But equality is an insufficient concept. No one claims that all five billion
humans must be given precisely equal treatment in all matters. Some ine-
qualities are considered fair and just, like punishing the guilty but not the
innocent. Some are considered unfair but lawful, like homelessness in the
midst of wealth.
Only a few inequalities violate legal rights to equality. Claims about
equality, or neutrality, always require further specification: equality with
respect to what classification, for what purpose, in what sense, and to what
extent? Let me briefly consider these four variables.
First, there is the classification at issue. Those who are similarly situated
should be treated equally, but what does it mean to be similarly situated?
If Congress grants benefits to 40-year-old women but not to 40-year-old
men, my claim will specify equality with respect to sex, and I will probably
win. But if I specify equality with respect to age-if I claim that 40-year-
old men are similar to 65-year-old men-I will surely lose. "S Our law embodies
a fairly strong and general commitment to sexual equality, but only a weak
and narrow commitment to age equality.
Second, there is the purpose of the classification. What it means to be
similarly situated depends on why we are asking. If I claim that my employer
fired me because of my age, then I have a claim under the age discrimination
laws.' 7 Forty-year-old men are similar to 65-year-old men for purposes of
hiring and firing, but not for purposes of social security.
15. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating different eligibility
standards for widows and widowers); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (same).
16. Cf. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding man-
datory retirement law); McCarthy v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 366 Mass. 779, 322 N.E.2d
758 (1975) (same).
17. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
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Third, there are different senses of equality. Two sharply different mean-
ings are inherent in the concepts of equality and neutrality. These different
meanings are familiar from the great national debate over affirmative ac-
tion. 8 Americans believe in equal opportunity and equal treatment, but in
some contexts, we also believe in equal impact and equal outcomes. This is
not an all-or-nothing universal choice; our choices vary with context. Few
people would argue that equal impact is never the relevant measure, but we
often disagree over when equal impact is the relevant measure.
Fourth, there is the extent of the claim. Is it sufficient for government to
treat people equally when it imposes penalties and distributes benefits-to
treat people equally in all tangible ways? Or do we also require government
to be neutral in intangible ways as well-to be neutral in its speech and
symbolic conduct? This distinction is critical to debates about religious
neutrality. I will call it the difference between equality and neutrality. When
I say government should be neutral towards religion, I mean to include the
claim that it should not express an opinion about religion. But this is a
controversial claim. Nothing in the concepts themselves will tell us whether
the religion clauses commit government to neutrality in this sense, or only
to equal treatment.
The first three variables are also controversial and insufficiently specified.
Equality with respect to religion does not even sufficiently specify the
classification. Religion may refer to status, to belief, to speech, or to conduct.
The principal line of disagreement is different for each of these.
Most of our serious disagreements are about religious conduct, and not
about religious status or belief. It is therefore religious conduct that is the
18. See, e.g., Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, 1 RECONSTRUCTION 6 (1990); Days,
Turning Back the Clock: The Reagan Administration and Civil Rights, 19 HAxv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 309 (1984); Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A
Response to the Scholars' Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989); Kennedy, Persuasion and
Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HAsv. L. Rv 1327 (1987); Kirp
& Weston, The Political Jurisprudence of Affirmative Action, 5 Soc. PfL. & POL'Y 223 (1987);
Laycock, Taking Constitutions Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review (Book Review), 59 Tax.
L. REv. 343, 376-85 (1981); Loury, Why Should We Care About Group Inequality, 5 Soc.
PEn.. & POL'Y 249 (1987); Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidis-
crimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. Rv. 423 (1980); Mitchell, Race-Conscious
Remedies: Pursuing Equal Employment Opportunity or Equal Employment Results?, 38 LAB.
L.J. 781 (1987); Rutherglen & Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and Title VII:
From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. Rv. 467 (1988); Schiff, Reverse Discrimination
Redefined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian Nightmare in the Enforcement of Civil Rights
Laws, 8 H.Asv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'y 627 (1985); Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup.
CT. REv. 99; Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution Must the Law Be Color-Blind?", 20
J. MARSHALL L. RaV. 201 (1986); Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court,
and the Constitution, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 775 (1979); Wright, Color Blind Theories and Color-
Conscious Remedies, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 213 (1980); Affirmative Action, 72 IowA L. Rav.
255 (symposium featuring Jesse Choper, Rex Lee, and Paul Brest); Joint Statement, Consti-
tutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 98 YAL. L.J. 1711 (1989); Scholars' Reply to Professor Fried, 99 YALE L.J. 163 (1989).
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principal subject of our inquiry into religious neutrality. Americans have
very different intuitions about what it means to say that religious conduct
is similarly situated to secular conduct, or what it means to treat religious
conduct equally.
In religion as elsewhere, the answers sometimes depend on the second
variable-the purpose of the classification. Whether we think religious con-
duct is similarly situated may depend on whether we are talking about direct
regulation of conduct, resolution of private disputes, expenditures of gov-
ernment funds, taxation and tax exemption, and so on through the whole
range of ways in which religion and government interact.
The debate over religious conduct also triggers sharp disagreement over
the choice between equal treatment and equal impact. This may be the most
fundamental source of disagreement about the meaning of neutrality toward
religion.
Because neutrality requires so much further specification, it cannot be the
only principle in the religion clauses. Nor can it be the most fundamental.
We must specify the content of neutrality by looking to other principles in
the religion clauses. When we have done that, neutrality should be defined
in a way that makes it largely congruent with those other principles. We will
often be able to explain the objection to a law by saying either that it
restricts the autonomy of religious belief or practice, or that it threatens
religious voluntarism, or that it deviates from religious neutrality, and so
on.
This variety of explanations is important, and the neutrality explanation
should not be omitted. In a nation of immense religious diversity, it is of
great symbolic value that government views all manner of religious belief
neutrally. That the government aspires to religious neutrality, and that the
courts stand ready to hold government to its aspiration, is an important
reassurance to religious minorities. We should not abandon or de-emphasize
that reassurance. We should not omit neutrality from our set of explanations,
even if we also offer other explanations, and even if some readers believe
that those other explanations are more fundamental. Neutrality has great
explanatory importance.
Neutrality also continues to have operational importance. If neutrality
properly understood is largely congruent with other principles of the religion
clauses, then any of these principles can be the warning flag that calls
attention to a threat to religious liberty. Sometimes the deviation from
neutrality will be the most obvious explanation of the danger, and even the
most fundamental.
For example, I think neutrality is the most straightforward explanation in
the equal access controversy. There is no general right to demand that the
government make its property available for religious observance: there is not
even such a right in narrow and especially appealing circumstances. The lack
of such a right is implicit in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, ,9 where the Court refused to stop the government from building
19. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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a useless road on land owned by the government but sacred to Native
Americans. There is no entitlement to special access to government property
for religious exercise.
Nevertheless, if the government makes its property available for meetings
of nonreligious private groups, then it must make that property equally
available to religious groups.20 This is a classic equality right. The equality
or neutrality explanation is the one that best and most directly fits the case.
Neutrality is the easiest way to recognize the problem, to decide the case,
and to explain the result.
More generally, I doubt that there is any single foundational principle
from which all the others can be derived. The religion clauses embody several
principles, which are largely congruent, but occasionally in tension. The
search for solutions is rarely a matter of deciding which principle is more
fundamental. The search for solutions is more like an iteration in mathe-
matics. In an iteration, you solve a problem by a series of approximations,
each building on the one before, until you have as close an approximation
as you need or as close as you can get with reasonable effort. We iterate
religion clause problems by considering them in light of each of the relevant
principles, including neutrality.
For all these reasons, I think that neutrality is worth defining. To that
end, I will sketch the principal conceptions of neutrality toward religion in
the cases and the literature, illustrating the differences with examples.
II. FoRMAL NEUTRALITY
By far the best known definition of religious neutrality is Philip Kurland's.
In 1961, he tendered the following principle:
The [free exercise and establishment] clauses should be read as stating a
single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for
action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be,
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to
impose a burden.2'
This standard of no religious classifications is closely akin to the equal
treatment and equal opportunity side of the affirmative action debate. But
the shift of context has enough implications so that a different label is
required. I will call this standard formal neutrality. I will not call it Kurland's
Rule, because I am not sure he intended it in the way it has come to be
understood. But I suspect that if you say "neutrality" to most religious
liberty scholars, the first thing that they think of is Philip Kurland and a
ban on religious classifications.
Formal neutrality sounds highly plausible until you think through its
implications. Its simplicity and apparent even-handedness are appealing. It
20. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074
(1988).
21. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. RyV. 1, 96 (1961).
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can explain some important cases, including my argument for the constitu-
tionality of the Equal Access Act.
Yet formal neutrality has been almost universally rejected.22 No major
commentator endorsed it for a generation, and no case has adopted it,
although many cases and commentators have applied part of it to particular
problems. Now an endorsement has come from a most unlikely source,
Professor Mark Tushnet. 23 Hardly anyone else has been willing to apply it
universally, because it produces surprising results that are inconsistent with
strong intuitions.
The most striking example is historical. The National Prohibition Act
forbad the sale or consumption of alcoholic beverages in the United States,
but it exempted the use of sacramental wine. 24 Under formal neutrality, the
exemption was unconstitutional. The exemption undeniably classified on the
basis of religion. It was lawful to consume alcohol in religious ceremonies,
but not otherwise.
Now consider Prohibition without the exemption. There would be no
violation of formal neutrality; religion would not even be mentioned in the
statute. But it would be a crime to celebrate the Eucharist or the Seder. If
the free exercise of religion includes anything beyond bare belief, it must be
the right to perform the sacred rituals of the faith. A law enacted largely at
the behest of Protestants that barred the sacred rites of Catholics and Jews,
a law that changed the way these rites had been performed for millennia,
could not be reconciled with any concept of religious liberty worthy of the
name. That the law was formally neutral and enacted for a secular purpose
would be no comfort to the victims.
But facial neutrality would be dispositive to the Supreme Court of the
United States. In a stunning opinion handed down after this lecture was
delivered, the Court said that government may regulate the Mass for good
reasons, bad reasons, or no reasons at all, so long as the regulation is facially
neutral and does not single out religion. 2' The Court held that criminal
punishment of the central religious ritual of an ancient faith raises no issue
under the free exercise clause and requires no governmental justification
whatever! The example that I chose because I thought it was beyond rea-
sonable argument has now been decided the other way.
Prohibition as applied to sacramental wine is the exemplar of a large class
of cases, in which the exercise of religion requires exemption from laws of
22. See Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 V[uL. L. REV. 3, 24 (1978).
23. Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup.
CT. REV. 373. It is suprising to find a leader of the critical legal studies movement endorsing
a rule of formal neutrality, implicitly assuming that the government is not responsible for the
unequal impact of its actions, and urging the virtues of clear legal doctrine.
24. An Act to Prohibit Intoxicating Beverages, ch. 85 § 6, 41 Stat. 305, 311 (1919).
25. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). For analysis of this case, see
Laycock, Peyote, Wine, and the First Amendment, 106 CHRtsTuA CENTURY 876 (1989).
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general applicability. Such exemptions are now a matter of legislative grace.
The Court did not go all the way to Professor Kurland's ban on exemptions
for religious exercise. Rather, it said that the Constitution is indifferent to
such exemptions-that legislatures may grant or refuse exemptions as they
choose.
I will return to the problem of exemptions for religious conduct. For now,
I note only that formal neutrality would permit a state to ban the Mass. If
it produces such an implausible result in a case at the core of religious
exercise, the principle is not off to a good start.
In the Prohibition example, formal neutrality seems to trample religion.
But formal neutrality also produces results that many Americans find un-
acceptably favorable to religion. Consider the case of financial aid to private
education. Under formal neutrality, government can give unlimited amounts
of unrestricted aid to religious schools, so long as the aid goes to all schools
and not to religious schools alone. But formal neutrality does not stop there.
Any aid to secular private schools must be given to religious schools, on
exactly the same terms. To exclude religious schools from the aid program,
or to impose restrictions on religious uses of the money, would be to classify
on the basis of religion. That would violate formal neutrality.
I do not think that this implication of formal neutrality is beyond the
range of reasonable debate. Indeed, I think it captures an important insight.
But I also believe that at least some of its results would be unconstitutional.
Stricter separationists react much more strongly. To many American se-
parationists, the possibility that government could fully fund religious edu-
cation must seem as preposterous as the banning of the Mass. This implication
of formal neutrality is wildly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's cases
and with dominant understandings of the establishment clause.26
As these two examples make clear, formal neutrality has something to
offend everybody. As a general standard, it appeals to none of the competing
factions in religion clause litigation. But it has had disproportionate influence
on our understanding of what it means to be neutral.
III. SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRALITY
My understanding of neutrality is quite different. Again because we need
a label, I will call my proposal "substantive neutrality."
My basic formulation of substantive neutrality is this: the religion clauses
require government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or
discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance
or nonobservance. 2 If I have to stand or fall on a single formulation of
26. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
27. This is a modest elaboration of the definition I offered in 1986:
I do not mean neutrality in the sense of a ban on religious classifications. Instead,
I mean neutrality in the sense of government conduct that insofar as possible neither
1990] 1001
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neutrality, I will stand or fall on that one. But I must elaborate on what I
mean by minimizing encouragement and discouragement. I mean that religion
is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything can be. It should proceed
as unaffected by government as possible. Government should not interfere
with our beliefs about religion either by coercion or by persuasion. Religion
may flourish or wither; it may change or stay the same. What happens to
religion is up to the people acting severally and voluntarily; it is not up to
the people acting collectively through government.
This elaboration highlights the connections among religious neutrality,
religious autonomy, and religious voluntarism.2 s Government must be neutral
so that religious belief and practice can be free. The autonomy of religious
belief and disbelief is maximized when government encouragement and
discouragement is minimized. The same is true of religious practice and
refusal to practice. The goal of maximum religious liberty can help identify
the baseline from which to measure encouragement and discouragement.
My conception of religious neutrality includes a neutral conception of
religion. That is, any belief about God, the supernatural, or the transcendent,
is a religious belief. For constitutional purposes, the belief that there is no
God, or no afterlife, is as much a religious belief as the belief that there is
a God or an afterlife. It is a belief about the traditional subject matter of
religion, and it is a belief that must be accepted on faith, because it is not
subject to empirical investigation. Serious believers and serious disbelievers
are sometimes troubled by this equation of their belief systems, but we
cannot make sense of the religion clauses without it. This constitutional
conception of religious belief as any belief about religion explains why atheists
are protected from persecution,29 and why the government cannot establish
atheism.
Similarly, the deeply held conscientious objection of a non-theist must be
treated equally with a similar objection rooted in a more traditional faith.
As a plurality of the Supreme Court put it in a statutory context, the relevant
category is "all those whose consciences . . . would give them no rest or
peace" if they were compelled to comply with government policy.3 0 To be
sure, there are difficulties in applying that standard to non-traditional sources
of conscience. But in a nation with millions of non-believers, no other
conception of conscientious objection is even plausibly neutral.
encourages nor discourages religious belief or practice. This requires identification
of a base line from which to measure encouragement and discouragement.
Laycock, supra note 1, at 3.
28. Cf. Smith, supra note 1, at 316 n.192 (listing commentators who argue that neutrality,
voluntarism, and separation are not consistent values).
29. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (requiring atheist to affirm belief in
God violates his "freedom of belief and religion"); cf. EEOC v. Townley Eng. & Mfg. Co.,
859 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1988) (requiring atheist employee to attend religious services at
work discriminates against him on basis of religion), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1527 (1989).
30. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970).
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That is a bare sketch of substantive neutrality. The next step is to compare
and contrast formal and substantive neutrality. Sometimes the two types of
neutrality produce the same result. That is, sometimes we can minimize
encouragement or discouragement to religion by ignoring the religious aspects
of some behavior and treating it just like some analogous secular behavior.
But often the two understandings of neutrality diverge. Government rou-
tinely encourages and discourages all sorts of private behavior. Under sub-
stantive neutrality, these encouragements and discouragements are not to be
applied to religion. Thus, a standard of minimizing both encouragement and
discouragement will often require that religion be singled out for special
treatment.
Consider two of the examples I have mentioned so far. To prohibit the
consumption of alcohol, without an exception for religious rituals, is to
flatly prohibit important religious practices. Such a prohibition would dis-
courage religious practice in the most coercive possible way-by criminalizing
it. Many believers would abandon their religious practice; some would defy
the law; some of those would go to jail. Such a law would be a massive
departure from substantive neutrality.
To exempt sacramental wine is not perfectly neutral either. Religious
observers would get to do something that is forbidden to the rest of the
population, but that observation goes to formal neutrality. Would this special
treatment encourage religion? It is conceivable that the prospect of a tiny
nip would encourage some desperate folks to join a church that uses real
wine, or to attend Mass daily instead of weekly or only at Easter. It is
conceivable, but only to a law professor or an economist. Such an exemption
would have only an infinitesimal tendency to encourage religious activity. In
contrast, withholding the exemption would severely discourage religious
activity. The course that most nearly approaches substantive neutrality-the
course that minimizes both encouragement and discouragement-is to single
out religious uses for an exemption. In this and similar applications, sub-
stantive neutrality is akin to the equal impact, equal outcome side of the
affirmative action debate.
Prohibition is an easy case under formal neutrality, and an easy case
under substantive neutrality. The difference is that substantive neutrality gets
the right answer. Formal neutrality, as applied to Prohibition, would lead
directly to religious persecution.
Sometimes the two concepts of neutrality seem to converge. In the equal
access controversy, I argued that substantive neutrality was best achieved by
something close to formal neutrality-that student religious groups should
be treated like any other student extracurricular group.3 To give them special
privileges would encourage religion; to exclude them would discourage relig-
ion.
31. Laycock, supra note I, at 10-11.
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But even in that example, some deviations from formal neutrality were
required. Most student extracurricular groups have a faculty sponsor, but it
is widely agreed that a student religious group should not have a faculty
sponsor.12 To say that the school will sponsor any student group except a
religious group is to classify on the basis of religion. Withholding the faculty
sponsor violates formal neutrality.
The school prayer cases" are the most obvious source of our intuition
that public schools should not provide faculty sponsors to student religious
groups. But substantive neutrality can explain that intuition. School spon-
sorship of a religious group commits the government to the success of a
religious group, thus encouraging religion and violating substantive neutral-
ity. Moreover, the faculty sponsor will inevitably influence the group's
conduct, thus encouraging some forms of religious practice and discouraging
others.
It is true that religious groups are in some sense discouraged by being
forced to organize and function without the school sponsorship available to
all other student groups. But withholding the sponsor does not actively harm
religious groups; it does not reduce or divert their own resources, or create
obstacles for them to overcome. It merely withholds an intrusive benefit that
is widely available to other groups that are in some ways analogous. The
hoped-for benefit may turn out to be seriously harmful if the government
sponsor changes the course of the religious organization. Withholding this
risky benefit is not perfectly neutral, but the deviation from neutrality is
considerably smaller than the deviations inherent in sponsorship. Thus, the
closest the schools can come to substantive neutrality is to leave such groups
alone.
Prohibition and equal access are simple examples. I have not yet gotten
to the hard cases, like public aid to religious schools. But even these simple
cases illustrate some important points about substantive neutrality.
Most obviously, substantive neutrality is harder to apply than formal
neutrality. It requires judgments about the relative significance of various
encouragements and discouragements to religion. Absolute zero is no more
attainable in encouragement and discouragement than in temperature. We
can aspire only to minimize encouragement and discouragement. Because
substantive neutrality requires more judgment than formal neutrality, sub-
stantive neutrality is more subject to manipulation by advocates and result-
oriented judges and law professors.
32. See id. at 28-31. The Equal Access Act somewhat ineptly provides that schools should
not sponsor student religious groups. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(2) & (3) (1988).
33. E.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (striking down statute authorizing moment
of silence "for meditation or voluntary prayer" where legislative history showed intent to return
prayer to public schools); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(state cannot require daily Bible reading and recitation of Lord's Prayer in public schools);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state may not compose or require recitation of official
state prayer).
1004 [Vol. 39:993
NEUTRALITY TOWARD RELIGION
More important, substantive neutrality requires a baseline from which to
measure encouragement and discouragement. What state of affairs is the
background norm from which to judge whether religion has been encouraged
or discouraged? This question also requires judgment; there is no simple test
that can be mechanically applied to yield sensible answers.
A conceivable mechanical standard is to treat religion as though govern-
ment did not exist. If religion is better off than if government did not exist,
it has been encouraged; if it is worse off, it has been discouraged. The only
thing to recommend this standard is its intellectual purity; I doubt that it
appeals to anyone in the real world.
To take the most obvious example, no one suggests that churches be
denied police and fire protection. Police and fire protection are sometimes
explained as merely incidental benefits.34 But to what are they incidental? I
am not at all sure that police and fire protection arise as an incident of
something else. These services are not incidental; they are provided outright
and for their own sake. One might say that police and fire protection for
churches is incidental to police and fire protection for everybody else, or
for all property in the community. But it is easy to imagine either isolated
or concentrated religious properties that would strain that rationale to the
breaking point. That rationale also fails to explain why we protect churches
against vandalism, embezzlement, and other property crimes that pose no
threat to the neighbors.
One of the Supreme Court's better opinions on incidental benefits answers
the question I have posed. A permissible benefit is one that is incidental to
a larger policy of neutrality.35 The benefits of police and fire protection are
such an incident of neutrality. Police and fire protection are such a universal
part of our lives that they have become part of the baseline. To deny police
and fire protection would be to outlaw religion in the original sense of that
word-to put religion outside the protection of the law. To demand that
churches provide their own police and fire protection in a modern society
would be to place an extraordinary obstacle in their way-a discouragement
that would make religion a hazardous enterprise indeed. To provide such
services does not make religion attractive to anyone who is not attracted on
the merits. As a practical matter, any encouragement is tiny. The discouraging
effect of cutting off basic services greatly exceeds the encouraging effect of
providing them.
Similar judgments about the baseline level of government activity are at
the heart of the equal access controversy. To deny religious groups a faculty
sponsor is neutral in the sense of leaving such groups where they would be
if government did not exist. But if government did not exist, there would
be no public schools and no classrooms in which groups could meet. The
opponents of equal access argued that use of the classroom was a benefit-
34. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976).
35. Id. at 746-47.
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an encouragement in the terms I have been using-that violated the estab-
lishment clause.3 6 The supporters of equal access argued that once classrooms
were made available to other extracurricular groups, the use of the room
was part of the baseline-a background norm that both religious and secular
groups could take for granted.3 7 Most of the opponents seemed to concede
that religious groups could use the streets and parks on an equal basis.3 1
Streets and parks are in the baseline by common consent; faculty sponsors
are not in the baseline; classrooms are controversial.
The proper background norm about public facilities is related to the
background norm about student behavior. If the norm is that students can
generally do what they want on their own time, subject only to restraints
on harmful or disruptive behavior, then banning religious groups is dis-
couragement. But if the norm is that high school students can do nothing
without school sponsorship, then allowing meetings looks like sponsorship,
and even endorsement, and excluding them from campus can be characterized
as the neutral course of simply declining to sponsor them. Opponents of
equal access have seriously made this argument.3 9 Supporters of equal access
have looked to basic first amendment principles, and to student free speech
cases not involving religion-to cases involving war protest and underground
newspapers. They argued that the relevant constitutional norm was that
unsponsored students could say what they wanted on school premises.4
Unless we carefully think through such issues, we will tend to select our
baselines by intuition, and we will give free rein to our political preferences
and our prejudices. Our preferences can operate freely because the principle
of neutrality by itself is insufficient to define the baseline. Judgments about
the state of the world must be brought to bear. Equally important, the other
principles of the religion clauses must be brought to bear. We must keep in
mind what neutrality is supposed to accomplish. Our goal is not to leave
religion in a Hobbesian state of nature, nor to leave it regulated exactly to
the extent that commercial businesses are regulated, with no extra burdens
and no exemptions. Our goal is to maximize the religious liberty of both
believers and nonbelievers.
I will return to the difficult problems of justifying and implementing
substantive neutrality. But first, I want to briefly introduce a third way in
which neutrality has been invoked.
36. Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Or-
ganized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A Proposal for a
Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 562-65 (1985).
37. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 1, at 10.
38. See, e.g., Teitel, supra note 36, at 582.
39. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 554-55 (3d Cir. 1984),
vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Teitel, supra note 36, at 579-90.
40. See Laycock, supra note i, at 16-17, 28, 47-51.
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IV. DISAGGREGATED NEUTRALITY
The Supreme Court is rarely content with a broad principle if it can
substitute a three-part test.4 1 Its most famous formulation of the neutrality
requirement is the second part of the Lemon test, which says that a law
violates the establishment clause if one of its substantial effects is either to
advance or inhibit religion.42 This formulation began simply as an elaboration
of neutrality, 43 but is often disaggregated into a test of no advancement and
a separate test of no inhibition. If a law has some substantial effect that
advances religion, that may be the end of the case. And there is sometimes
a very low threshold for finding effects to be substantial.
In the extreme case of Aguilar v. Felton," the Supreme Court invalidated
a federal program to provide remedial instruction in math and reading to
low income children in private schools. Congress enacted this program in
pursuit of neutrality-to provide the same remedial program to disadvantaged
children without regard to their religious choices. Why did the Court strike
it down? Because the public employees who provided the remedial instruction
might be influenced by the religious environment of parochial schools, and
under that hypnotic influence, might encourage the children to religious
belief.45 That possibility created a risk of a substantial effect of advancing
religion; that risk could be avoided only by close supervision that would
excessively entangle church and state. 46 That was the end of the case.
I call this disaggregated neutrality, because it looks only at one side of
the balance of advancing or inhibiting. Because absolute zero is not achiev-
able, it is always possible to find some effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion. Thus, if you look only at one side of the balance, you can always
find a constitutional violation. Some of those who would have government
sponsor their faith play the same game on the inhibits side of the balance:
if government does not lead school children in prayer, or display religious
symbols on major holidays, the public may infer that government is hostile
to religion.4 7 Therefore, these critics conclude, silence is not neutral.
41. See generally Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165 (1985).
42. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971), as modified in Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n.39 (1973).
43. The antecedents of the test are traced in Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 COLUM. L. Rv. 1373, 1380-81 (1981).
44. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
45. Id. at 411-12.
46. Id. at 412-14.
47. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3135 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); W. MOBERLY, THE CRISIS IN THE
UNIVERSITY 55-56 (1949); J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984); Hitchcock, Church,
State and Moral Values: The Limits of American Pluralism, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3
(Spring 1981); Note, A Moment of Silence: A Permissible Accommodation Protecting the
Capacity to Form Religious Belief, 61 IND. L.J. 429, 431-33 (1986).
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Substantive neutrality always requires that the encouragement of one policy
be compared to the discouragement of alternative policies. The principal
effect of Aguilar was to greatly increase the cost of providing remedial
programs to children in private schools.4 8 After Aguilar, the government or
the school must provide separate off-campus facilities and the children must
travel to those facilities and back again. The effect of increasing the cost
was to reduce the number of children who could be served. So thousands
of our least advantaged citizens are now forced to choose: forfeit their right
to remedial instruction in math and reading, or forfeit their right to education
in a religious environment. That effect discourages religion, and dwarfs the
risk that the government's remedial math or reading teacher might suddenly
start proselytizing. By disaggregating neutrality, the Court has lost sight of
its original objective.
Another way to disaggregate neutrality is to shift back and forth among
different versions of neutrality without explanation. If you think that neu-
trality with respect to government-imposed burdens means that churches and
believers never get an exemption (formal neutrality), but that neutrality with
respect to government benefits means that churches can never participate
(disaggregated substantive neutrality), you had better have a good explana-
tion. The most obvious explanation is simply hostility to religion. If you
have the opposite preferences, you are equally in need of a good explanation.
Voting patterns in the Supreme Court are often disaggregated, sometimes
in suspicious ways. Justice Brennan applied formal neutrality to strike down
a legislative tax exemption in Texas Monthly, Inc.,49 and he applied disag-
gregated neutrality to strike down the remedial education program in Aguilar.50
But he believes the Constitution requires exemptions from laws that violate
religious conscience, a position consistent with substantive neutrality." Justice
Rehnquist takes the opposite position on all three of these issues.,' Justice
Stevens agrees with Brennan on tax exemptions53 and aid to religious schools , 4
but with Rehnquist on exemptions for conscience." Stevens votes against
traditional religions on all three issues, an odd interpretation of religious
liberty.
48. The costs of implementing Aguilar are carefully assessed in T. VITULLO-MARTIN & B.
COOPER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND CHILD: THE CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL AID TO RELIGIOUS
SCHOOLS 41-66 (1987).
49. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 897-900 (1989) (plurality opinion).
50. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (opinion of the Court by Brennan, J.).
51. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 520-24 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Brennan, J., joining opinion of the Court).
52. Texas Monthly, Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 907-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Aguilar, 473
U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (opinion of the Court);
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
53. Texas Monthly, Inc., 109 S. Ct. at 897-900 (Stevens, J., joining plurality opinion).
54. Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402 (Stevens, J., joining opinion of the Court).
55. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510-13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261-64 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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In the Term since this lecture was delivered, the Court has dramatically
embraced formal neutrality to uphold taxation and regulation of churches
and believers.56 In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, the Court unanimously held
that churches can be taxed, so long as the tax laws do not single out churches
for discriminatory rates or incidents of taxation. The Court in dictum
suggested that it would apply the same standard to regulation of churches,
except where compliance with the regulation would require the church to
violate its "sincere religious beliefs."'57 In Employment Division v. Smith,
the exception for sincere religious belief disappeared by a vote of five to
four. 8 The free exercise of religion now means that churches cannot be taxed
or regulated any more heavily than General Motors. The only remaining
protection is that provided by formal neutrality; religious conduct cannot be
singled out for facially discriminatory regulation.
The Court recognized that these holdings burdened the exercise of religion.
The Smith opinion acknowledged that the conduct at issue was "the 'exercise
of religion,"' 5 9 and that Oregon had subjected this conduct to "an across-
the-board criminal prohibition,' ' but it insisted that this prohibition of an
exercise of religion did not mean that Oregon was "prohibiting the free
exercise of religion."'1 In Swaggart, the Court said that the economic burden
of paying the tax, and "substantial administrative burdens" of collecting
the tax or complying with other regulations, were "not constitutionally
significant.' '62 The Court found it "undeniable that a generally applicable
tax has a secular purpose and neither advances nor inhibits religion, for the
very essence of such a tax is that it is neutral and nondiscriminatory on
questions of religious belief.' '63
This conception of neutrality is irreconcilable with Aguilar and the other
cases striking down government payments to religiously affiliated schools.
In Aguilar, the federally-funded instruction in remedial math and reading
was directed on equal terms to poor children in all schools, public and
private, secular and religious. But the Court did not say that this "neutral
and nondiscriminatory" instruction "neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Instead, it found that the government money conferred obvious benefits on
religion, and did not say that those benefits were of no constitutional
significance.
The Court's current position comes to this: when government demands
money or obedience from churches, neutrality consists of treating churches
56. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990).
57. 110 S. Ct. at 696-97.
58. 110 S. Ct. 1595.
59. Id. at 1599 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
60. Id. at 1603.
61. Id. at 1599.
62. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688, 696, 698 (1990).
63. Id. at 698.
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just like other subjects of taxation or regulation, and it is irrelevant that the
church is worse off than it would be without the tax or the regulation. But
when government pays money to churches, neutrality consists of not making
the churches any better off than they would be without the payment, and it
is irrelevant that the churches are treated just like other beneficiaries of the
same program.
Whatever explains these results, it is not a consistent understanding of
neutrality. I suspect that the Justices are not deciding on the basis of
neutrality at all, although they invoke it in their opinions. If they are deciding
on the basis of neutrality, they have not defined it in any consistent way.
But the inconsistency of the current rules may be only a transitional step on
the way to widespread application of formal neutrality as the rule of judicial
decision.
The current rules may result from a temporary .voting paradox. Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun would restrict both regulation of religion
and government support of religion. Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and
Kennedy would generally permit both regulation and support of religion.
Justice O'Connor is a swing vote on both regulation and support. For all
eight of these Justices, their votes in religion clause cases are best explained
by their general attitudes toward judicial enforcement of constitutional rights.
Justice Stevens is the exception. He votes with the judicial activists on
most issues, including the establishment clause, but he joins the judicial
minimalists in free exercise cases. The apparent explanation for his voting
pattern is hostility to religion. Religion in his view is subject to all the
burdens of government, but entitled to few of the benefits. And because the
Court has been closely divided between activist and minimalist judges, he
has been a swing vote on religion issues. His hostility to religion is reflected
in the Court's rules, even though he has but one vote.
Aguilar, the decision striking down federally-funded remedial instruction
in religious schools, was a five-four decision in 1985. Justices Scalia and
Kennedy have replaced Burger and Powell, and it is a reasonable guess that
if it came up today, Aguilar would be five-four the other way. We may
soon see a formal neutrality opinion upholding government aid to religious
education.
That hypothetical development would greatly reduce the inconsistencies in
the Court's opinions. But it would not be a triumph for neutrality. Legis-
latures would be free to practice disaggregated formal neutrality. They could
support religion or burden it, support some religions and burden others, as
long as they stated their rules in facially neutral terms. The Court in Smith
acknowledged somewhat euphemistically that its decision "will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in.'"64 In plain English, this means that churches without political clout may
be suppressed, that more powerful churches may be accommodated, and if
64. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
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the principle is extended to the financial aid cases, they may be supported.
If the Court's decisions are eventually reconciled in this way, the explanatory
principle will not be neutrality, but statism. The majority will be permitted
to do anything it can achieve by facially neutral rules, however gerryman-
dered, and the Court will have largely abdicated its role of protecting religious
minorities.
V. APPLYING SUBSTANTIVE NEUTRALITY
Formal and substantive neutrality are broad categories. But as I noted
earlier, religious liberty controversies present a succession of specific prob-
lems. It is necessary to search out the most neutral course with respect to
each problem. That process will at least clarify our disagreements, and it
might provide some basis for principled argument to legislatures and state
courts.
Recall my distinction between equality and neutrality: equality refers only
to tangible penalties and rewards; neutrality also includes expression of
government opinion. It seems to me that we have widespread consensus on
both equality and neutrality with respect to religious status, consensus on
equality but not on neutrality with respect to religious belief, consensus
except for a few exceptional cases with respect to religious speech, and no
consensus at all with respect to religious conduct.
That is a glib set of categories; what do I mean by them? First, consensus
with respect to status: almost no one any longer openly claims that non-
believers, or non-Christians, or non-Protestants, should be discriminated
against because of their religious affiliation. There are occasional exceptions,
such as the recent attacks on Father Healy's appointment to head the New
York Public Library. 65 But these attacks are nearly always disguised with
pretextual justifications. Moreover, hardly anyone thinks it a proper function
of government to denounce the adherents of some religious faiths and laud
the adherents of others.
Second, partial consensus with respect to religious belief: we have consen-
sus on equality; no one argues that government should actively penalize
65. For news stories, see Barron, Georgetown's President Named Head of Public Library,
New York Times, Feb. 24, 1989, at BI, col. 2; Kleiman, Jesuits See Library Post as Part of
Their Mission, New York Times, Feb. 25, 1989, at A33, col. 1; Steinfels, Priest Picked for
Library Post Responds To Critics, New York Times, Apr. 2, 1989, at A29, col. 1. For editorials,
one on each side, see The Librarian Priest, New York Times, Mar. 21, 1989, at A24, col. I
(opposed); Father Healy as Public Man, New York Times, Apr. 9, 1989, at A26, col. I
(supporting). For letters to the editor, see New York Times, Mar. 1, 1989, at A24, col. 3 (Gay
Talese, opposed); New York Times, Mar. 16, 1989, at A30, col. 4 (Garry Wills, supporting);
New York Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at A34, col. 3 (Joseph Heller, opposed: Albert H. Bowker
& Joseph S. Murphy, supporting; Andrew Humm, Eleanor Cooper, and Tom Smith, opposed);
New York Times, Apr. 13, 1989, at A26, col. 3 (Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, supporting;
Paul Halsall, supporting); New York Times, Apr. 21, 1989, at A30, col. 3 (Andrew M. Greeley,
supporting); New York Times, May 8, 1989, at A18, col. 3 (Peter G. Finn, supporting).
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some religious beliefs and reward others. But we do not have consensus on
neutrality. A vocal minority of lawyers and scholars,6 and perhaps a majority
of the public, 67 believe that government may endorse a preferred religious
belief. Some urge generic theism, some the Judeo-Christian tradition, some
Christianity. Whatever their preferred teaching, these people reject the Su-
preme Court's holdings that government should be neutral with respect to
religious belief. And of course, the Supreme Court itself does not seem to
take those holdings very seriously.6
8
Third, partial consensus with respect to religious speech: religious speech
and political speech are the two core cases of highly protected speech, and
they should be treated equally. A long line of Supreme Court cases are
consistent with that proposition,69 and I think there is widespread agreement
with those results, although not necessarily with my formulation of the
principle. Religious speech in and around public schools is an exceptional
case where consensus breaks down. Consensus also breaks down when money
is involved, as in the Texas Monthly case, in the campaign finance and
disclosure laws,7 0 and in the restrictions on political speech in the Internal
Revenue Code. 71 My principle that religious and political speech should be
treated equally could have explained the Texas Monthly case, and my
principle had some relation to the discordant and troublesome combination
of opinions that made up the majority. The more recent decision in Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries72 makes it harder to sustain benign readings of Texas
Monthly. But it remains open to the Court to uphold a tax exemption that
66. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3140-45 (1989) (Kennedy J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States:
Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464 (1986) (argument that religion
clauses require neutrality between religion and nonreligion "would have struck the founding
generation as bizarre"); Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular
Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1, 21-25 (1978)
(Supreme Court rulings have replaced theism with secular humanism as an established faith).
67. See, e.g., H. MCCLOSKY & A. BRIL, THE DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERICANS
THINK ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 133 (1983).
68. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding municipal creche); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative chaplain who opens daily sessions with
prayer).
69. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395
(1953); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Largent v. Texas,
318 U.S. 418 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444 (1938).
70. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Powe, Mass Speech, 1982 Sup. CT.
REv. 243.
71. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982). For criticism of the use of tax exemptions to restrict religious
speech, see Caron & Dessingue, IRC § 501(c)(3): Practical and Constitutional Implications of
"Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169 (1985); Gaffney, On Not Rendering to Caesar:
The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relating to
Politics, 40 DEPAUL. L. REV. 1 (1990) (forthcoming).
72. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688 (1990), discussed
in text supra notes 56-63.
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includes religious speech in some broader category, such as not-for-profit
speech, or religious, anti-religious, and political speech. The relationship
between constitutional protections for religious and political speech is now
before the Court in the quite different context of judgments against churches
for such speech torts as defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.1 3
Finally, dissensus with respect to religious conduct. What does it mean to
be neutral with respect to conscientious objection to government policy, or
religious education, or religious charities, or the management of religious
institutions? I am not sure we have consensus that either equality or neutrality
is required with respect to religious conduct; we certainly have no consensus
on what that means.
Allow me to consider just one of these examples, exemption from facially
neutral laws that forbid religious conduct or require people to violate deeply
held conscientious beliefs. The Supreme Court repeatedly announced the
constitutional right to such exemptions, but enforced it half-heartedly.14 The
Reagan Administration quietly hammered at that right for eight years. 75 Now
the Court has wholly repudiated the right.
76
Scholars are also attacking the right to exemption, often in the name of
neutrality. Two major scholars have recently offered all out attacks on the
73. George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, No. D007153 (Cal. App. 4th
Dist. 1989), cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3598 (Feb. 28, 1990).
74. Compare Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989) (employee
who loses his job for religious reasons is entitled to unemployment compensation); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (same); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707 (1981) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents who conscientiously
object to public high school exempted from compulsory education laws); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (another unemployment compensation case) with Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military can discipline officer for wearing yarmulke with uniform); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-04 (1983) (pervasively religious school that
conscientiously forbids interracial dating by students has no constitutional right to retain its
charitable tax exemption); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (conscientious objectors
to social security have no constitutional right to refuse to pay social security taxes); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objectors to unjust wars have no constitutional
right to exemption from serving in such wars).
75. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 7-10, Hobbie
v. Florida Unemployment Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (No. 85-993) (arguing that government
may restrict or penalize free exercise of religion as long as it does not prohibit free exercise of
religion); Brief for the Appellants at 27-30, Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (No. 84-780)
(arguing that government's interest in denying constitutional exemption to conscientious objector
must be measured by the cost of repealing the challenged law entirely, and not by the cost of
exempting conscientious objectors); Brief for the Respondents, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986) (No. 84-1097) (arguing against right to wear yarmulke with military uniform);
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5-15, Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985)
(No. 83-1944) (arguing that Constitution does not require exemption from photograph required
for driver's license); Brief for the United States at 15-18, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982) (No. 80-767) (arguing that Constitution does not protect against indirect burdens on
exercise of religion).
76. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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constitutional right to such exemptions. One is Ellis West, a political scientist
at the University of Richmond;" the other is William Marshall, a lawyer at
Case Western Reserve.7"
Neither the scholars or the Court goes as far as requiring formal neu-
trality.7 9 Neither claims that exemptions for religion are unconstitutional
when the legislature voluntarily grants them. Both rely on the formal con-
ception of neutrality, but both draw back from its full implications, or at
least from the claim that it is constitutionally required.
They do not appear to flinch from the full implications of their claim that
the Constitution requires no exemptions for religious exercise. I assume that
they would permit a state to enact Prohibition without an exception for the
Mass or the Seder. The Court says as much in its opinion, 0 and Professor
West said as much in response to a question.8 ' He also said that if a law
forbidding ethnic and religious discrimination in employment had no excep-
tion for rabbis, then a synagogue might have to hire a Baptist rabbi. He
defended himself on the ground that no state would pass such a law, and
that probably the Baptist would be unqualified on some other ground.82
The hope that no state would pass such a law is insufficient protection
for religious minorities. It is true that Americans are more tolerant than
many other populations, in part because of the teachings of the religion
clauses. Many religious minorities have assimilated into the general culture
and into the political process, and the legislature is unlikely to knowingly
victimize these minorities in ways that go to the heart of their faith. That is
why Jews and Catholics were protected by an exception to Prohibition.
But the precondition of assimilation and respectability is why Oregon has
failed to protect Native Americans' ritual use of peyote.83 This social pre-
condition is why in the nineteenth century we denied Mormons the right to
vote,8 4 imprisoned some of their leaders, 5 confiscated all the property of
their church,8 6 and dissolved its legal existence, 7 until the church changed
its practice, its teaching, and its belief on plural marriage. 8 This social
precondition is why multi-million-dollar tort judgments threaten the very
77. West, The Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L.,
ETHICS, & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990).
78. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption,
40 CASE W. REs. 357 (1989-90).
79. But see Tushnet, supra note 23, at 384, 402.
80. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1599 (using example of "sacramental use of bread and wine").
81. Oral exchange at Notre Dame conference on religious liberty, South Bend, Indiana,
March 1989.
82. Id.
83. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
84. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S: 333 (1890).
85. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
86. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1 (1890).
87. Id.
88. See J. NOONAN, THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERs TRAT ARE 207 (1987).
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existence of the Hare Krishnas, the Scientologists, and other so-called "cults." 9
I am not much comforted by the prospect that only small and unfamiliar
religions will be persecuted.
Nor am I willing to assume that larger religious minorities are always safe.
The Church of Christ is hardly a fringe group in Collinsville, Oklahoma,
but it too is threatened with destruction from a huge tort judgment for
intangible harm to a disgruntled former member. 90 In this decade, the military
attempted to eliminate Jewish officers who wore their yarmulke while in
uniform. In what appeared to be a fit of unthinking deference, the Supreme
Court upheld that practice.9' Congress intervened with protective legislation, 92
but much harm had been done in the meantime. In retrospect, the Court's
refusal to protect yarmulkes was a precursor to its refusal in Smith to protect
any religious conduct at all.
In times of political excitement, of xenophobia, of outbursts of anti-
Catholic or anti-Semitic feeling, almost any kind of law is possible, especially
at the state and local level. The question is not merely what the federal
government might do in such times, although that is scary enough. It was
Congress that persecuted the Mormons, and the federal executive that tried
to purge observant Jewish military officers. But we must also consider what
state and local jurisdictions with religiously homogeneous populations might
do to small and unfamiliar minorities. The point is not that such populations
are any less enlightened than other Americans, but simply that the forces of
pluralism are more attenuated in homogenous communities. What might
Utah, or Arkansas, or Yalobusha County do in times of excitement? We
have a bill of rights to be enforced by an independent judiciary in part to
get us through such times with minimal damage. To claim that the worst
horror stories are unlikely to happen is to miss the point of a bill of rights.
I start with overt hostility because it would be a mistake to assume it
away. But hostility is not the only source of law forbidding people to practice
their religions, and probably not even the most important. The practice of
a small faith may be forbidden just because the legislature did not know
89. See George v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, No. D007153 (Cal. App.
4th Dist. 1989) ($32.7 million verdict reduced to $3 million), cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3598
(1990); Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology, 212 Cal. App. 3d 872, 260 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1989)
($30 million verdict remitted to $2.5 million), cert. filed, 58 U.S.L.W. 3579 (Feb. 23, 1990);
Church Universal & Triumphant, Inc. v. Witt, No. B021187 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1989) ($1.5
million), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 839 (1990); O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 112 Idaho 472, 733 P.2d
693 (1986) ($1 million); Christofferson v. Church of Scientology, 5 Religious Freedom Rptr.
126 (Or. Cir. Ct. Multnomah County 1985) ($39 million). For earlier proceedings in Christof-
ferson, see 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577, review denied, 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928 (1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983). The California courts appear not to believe that judicial
destruction of a minority faith even requires a published opinion.
90. Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989) ($390,000 against local congre-
gation).
91. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
92. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988).
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about it and never considered its needs. Then the bureaucracy will grind
forward, enforcing the rule without regard to exceptional circumstance. This
may be what happened to Frances Quaring, who thought the picture on her
driver's license was a graven image forbidden by the second commandment.93
The Frances Quarings of the world may or may not be organized enough
to get the attention of the legislature, but a court is required to listen to
their complaint and to rule one way or the other.
Of course, inadvertence can interact with hostility, or with an insensitivity
that borders on hostility. Consider what might happen when Frances Quaring
writes her legislator. She may get a sympathetic response and a legislated
exemption. But her legislator may find it so impossible to empathize with
her belief that he never seriously considers whether an exemption would be
workable. Even if he empathizes, the legislative calendar is crowded, and
the original statute having been enacted, all the burdens of legislative inertia
now work against an exemption.
For a variety of reasons, therefore, we cannot always rely on legislatures
to protect minority religious conduct. Courts are not always better, but they
give religious liberty claims a second chance to be heard. 94 If we take seriously
the constitutional right to freely exercise religion, we must restore a judicially
enforceable right to religious exemption in appropriate cases.
The right to exemptions for religious conduct is more easily explained in
terms of religious liberty than in terms of neutrality. But the right is consistent
with substantive neutrality, and it can be explained in those terms as well.
As I have already noted with respect to Prohibition, a law that penalizes
religious conduct discourages religion. The discouragement is often severe,
as when the penalty is criminal punishment or Frances Quaring's loss of the
right to drive. But in many of the cases, an exemption for conscientious
objectors has only a de minimus tendency to encourage any aspect of religion.
The exemption is substantively neutral; the lack of an exemption is not.
Another way to state this is that equal impact comes closer to the proper
sense of neutrality with respect to conscientious objection. People with a
deeply held conscientious objection to a law are not similarly situated to
people without such an objection. To insist on formally equal treatment of
objectors and non-objectors is to pursue the same majestic equality that
forbids the rich and the poor alike to sleep under bridges. 95
Substantive equality and equal impact are not wholly equivalent. The
difference between them appears in cases where religious belief coincides too
93. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by equally divided Court,
sub nom. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
94. 1 elaborate on the second-chance rationale for judicial review in Laycock, Notes on the
Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional
Rights (Book Review), 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1727-30 (1990).
95. See BARTLETT's FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 802a (14th ed. 1968) ("The law, in its majestic
equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and
to steal bread") (quoting A. FRANcE, LE LYs ROUGE (1894)).
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closely with self-interest, as in conscientious objection to military service or
payment of taxes. The distorting effects of self-interest do not make sincere
conscientious objectors similarly situated with non-objectors; denying the
exemption still has severe and unequal impact on objectors. The equal impact
sense of neutrality would focus on the objectors and presumptively grant
the exemption, subject only to the government's proof of a compelling
reason to deny it.
But substantive neutrality as I have defined it must also consider the non-
objectors. If we grant exemptions from military service or general taxation,
on the basis of conscientious objection, we will inevitably encourage religion.
I do not refer to the people willing to feign religious belief in order to claim
an exemption. There may be millions of these people, and the difficulty of
adjudicating their false claims is relevant to the government's claim of
compelling interest, 96 but these false claimants are only incidentally relevant
to neutrality.
I refer instead to the people who honestly persuade themselves that they
have come to hold the religious belief that entitles them to the exemption,
or who feel pressured to adopt that belief. Human nature being what it is,
there may be millions of these people as well. The lure of exemption creates
cognitive dissonance between the individual's desire for the exemption and
the belief that makes him ineligible for it. The psychological effort to reduce
this dissonance can move his actual belief into conformity with the belief
that serves his self-interest. 97
The problem for religious neutrality is that denying the exemption dis-
courages religious belief in one set of people, and granting the exemption
encourages religious belief in another, overlapping, set of people. It is no
longer clear that exemption is the more nearly neutral course. If we suspect
that the original number of conscientious objectors is small, and that the
number of non-objectors seriously tempted by the exemption is large, then
denying the exemption appears to be more nearly neutral than granting it.
If we have no plausible estimate of which effect is larger, then there may
be no basis in substantive neutrality for the courts to second-guess the
legislature.
Whatever we do in these difficult cases, the deviation from neutrality is
large. Either we will deny the exemption, with severe and unequal impact
on the original objectors, devastating to their religious liberty, or we will
grant the exemption, and greatly encourage religious belief in the objectors
induced by the exemption. The case is hard, and the most nearly neutral
course will not be very neutral.
Legislatures can sometimes solve these problems by imposing an alternative
burden, designed to accommodate conscience while reducing the self-inter-
96. See Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United
States, 1983 SuP. CT. Rav. 1, 20-30; Marshall, supra note 78; West, supra note 77.
97. See generally L. FESTINGER, COGNtrrE DISSONANCE 1-31, 84-122 (1957).
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ested reasons for claiming the exemption. That is part of the logic of the
alternative service requirement for objectors to military service, 98 and of the
requirement that workers who object to union dues make an equivalent
contribution to a charity other than their church." These legislative solutions
are not perfect-thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses spent World War II in
prison because they objected even to alternative service 100-but they permit
a closer approximation to substantive neutrality. They come from thoughtful
legislatures; it is harder to see how courts could create them.
VI. CONCLUSION
I hope I have at least persuaded you that the meaning of neutrality is not
self-evident, and that substantive neutrality is a possible alternative to formal
neutrality. Beyond that, I hope I have persuaded you that substantive
neutrality is more consistent with religious liberty than is formal neutrality.
I have much more work to do to show that a neutral baseline can usually
be identified in a principled way across the whole range of interactions
between religion and government. But I hope I have persuaded you that the
work is worth doing. For that is the path toward maximum religious liberty,
neutrally distributed among all kinds of believers and non-believers. And
that multifarious formulation is as close as I can come to a single principle
that summarizes the religion clauses.
98. 50 U.S.C. App. § 4566) (1982).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (Supp. V. 1987).
100. M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE: THE AMERICAN STATE AND THE
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR, 1940-1947, at 84 (1952).
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